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THE FUTURE OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS IN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS: LEWIS CREATES 
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT  
By 
Meghan M. Gonyea* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 In 2011, the United States Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 
563 U.S. 333 (2011) (“Concepcion”) validated adhesive arbitration agreements. 1 
Concepcion held that California’s Discover Bank rule, which attempted to ban class action 
waivers in most consumer contracts, was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”).2 While the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly upheld class action waivers in the 
consumer context, this decision left considerable room for the lower courts to interpret 
class action waivers found in employment agreements.3  
 The National Labor Relations Board (“Board”), empowered by the National Labor 
Relations Act4 (“NLRA”), decided D.R. Horton Inc. and Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. 
2277 (2012)5 (“Michael Cuda”), and found that employers who banned class action claims 
in both arbitral and judicial forums violated the NLRA because class actions were 
“concerted activity,” and thus protected by the statute.6 This victory for employees was 
short-lived, after the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce Michael Cuda on appeal, because the 
Board’s decision “did not give proper weight to the Federal Arbitration Act.”7 Only a 
couple of years later, the Seventh Circuit decided Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 
1147 (7th Cir. 2016),8 creating a split in authority among the circuit courts that will now 
be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in the October 2017 Term.9 
                                                 
* Meghan M. Gonyea is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2018 Juris 
Doctor candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 See generally AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). 
2 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (Cal. 2005). 
3 See generally Concepcion 563 U.S. at 352. 
4 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012). 
5 See D.R. Horton, Inc. and Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. 2277 (2012). 
6 See Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2288 (discussing “concerted activity” as “employees’ ability to join 
together to pursue workplace grievances, including through litigation.”). 
7 D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013).  
8 See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016). 
9 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/epic-systems-
corp-v-lewis/. 
 In Lewis, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to support the Board’s 
interpretation that the NLRA precludes class action waivers. 10   The Seventh Circuit 
reconciled the NLRA and FAA, finding no conflict between the two federal statutes 
because the NLRA and FAA “work[ed] hand in glove.”11 The Seventh Circuit’s decision 
will soon undergo review by the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the relationship between 
the NLRA and the FAA, and further, to settle the validity of class action waivers in 
employment agreements.12 
 This article will first provide background information regarding class action 
waivers in both the consumer and employment context.  Next, this article will discuss the 
NLRA and how the Board attempted to interpret the federal statute as precluding class 
arbitration waivers.  This discussion will then provide an overview of the circuit split 
created by the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Lewis.  Finally, this article will discuss the 
potential implications of the Lewis decision, and suggest how the decision created a 
framework for the U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate class action waivers in employment 
agreements.  This article will highlight the current landscape of the U.S. Supreme Court 
after the 2016 presidential election, and the potential influence of that landscape on the 
outcome of class action waivers in employment agreements. 
II. U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT GOVERNING CLASS ACTION WAIVERS  
In the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court “revolutionized” arbitration in the labor 
context by deciding the “Steelworkers Trilogy.” 13  The Steelworkers Trilogy cases 
encouraged the practice of arbitration to resolve labor disputes, and also directed courts to 
limit any merits review of arbitral disputes.14 Further, in the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court 
exercised deference to arbitration clauses found within employee collective bargaining 
agreements.15 Businesses soon “seized on the judicial approval of statutory claims” and 
began placing adhesive arbitration provisions in both consumer and employment 
contracts.16 The disadvantages of these agreements for both consumers and employees 
                                                 
10 See Lewis 823 F.3d at 1151. 
11 Id. at 1157. 
12 SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 9. 
13 See Ann C. Hodges, Trilogy Redux: Using Arbitration to Rebuild the Labor Movement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
1682, 1682 (2014).   
14 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of 
Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 
363 U.S. 564 (1960).  
15 See generally Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
16 Hodges, supra note 13, at 1682-83. 
include (1) the deprivation of jury trials; (2) limited discovery and available damages; and 
(3) a limited, or even no ability to bring class action suits.17  
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a recent trilogy of arbitration cases, continued to strip 
away the rights of consumers and employees who are forced into agreements to arbitrate.18 
This recent trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court cases did not address class action waivers in 
employment agreements, but each decision interpreted the FAA, and such precedent “has 
been interpreted to cover arbitration agreements in the employment setting.”19 While the 
strong federal policy favoring arbitration is undeniable, the value of collective actions, in 
particular for consumers and employees, cannot be overlooked.  The Seventh Circuit’s 
Lewis decision, along with proposed rules by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”), represent a fundamental shift in the future validity of class action waivers in 
adhesive arbitration agreements. 
To further understand the U.S. Supreme Court’s hostility toward class actions in 
the arbitral context, an analysis of Concepcion provides insight.20  First, the Court was 
concerned with the “structural” issues surrounding class-wide arbitration.21 Next, the Court 
stated that class arbitration made the arbitral process “slower, more costly, and more likely 
to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”22 The Court also noted that Congress 
did not envision class arbitration when the FAA was passed in 1925.23 The Court continued 
its analysis by generally providing that “class arbitration greatly increases risks to 
defendants,” and “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.”24  
                                                 
17 Hodges, supra note 13, at 1683. 
18  See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (noting that 
Concepcion resolved the case at issue, and further that class arbitration interfered with the fundamental 
attributes of arbitration); Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352 (holding that the FAA preempted a California rule that 
attempted to ban class action waivers in adhesive consumer contracts); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (holding that an arbitration panel exceeded its powers by concluding 
that the arbitration clause allowed for class arbitration). 
19 See Hodges, supra note 13, at 1689 (summarizing the holdings of these three Supreme Court cases: “(1) 
class arbitration cannot be ordered where an arbitration agreement does not explicitly provide for it; (2) a 
California rule that invalidated most class action waivers in arbitration agreements as unconscionable was 
preempted by the FAA; and (3) a class action waiver is enforceable even if an individual claim would cost 
more to litigate than is available in damages, rejecting the argument that the arbitration agreement denied 
affective vindication of the statutory claim.”). 
20 See generally Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347-51. 
21 See id. at 347-48 (stating several concerns, including (1) the fact that class arbitration includes absent 
parties, (2) confidentiality becomes more difficult, and (3) arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the 
procedural aspects of certification). 
22 Id. at 348. 
23 See id. at 349. 
24 Id. at 350. 
Thus, even though the U.S. Supreme Court has defined arbitration as a “mere form 
of trial,”25 it is yet unwilling to give parties to arbitration the same ability to bring claims 
collectively in the arbitral forum.26  Without considering the advantages of class arbitration 
for consumers and employees who are forced into arbitration through adhesion, the U.S. 
Supreme Court engaged in a one-sided argument, which, as a result, has limited the rights 
of many individuals to act collectively.27 
The four Justices who dissented in the Concepcion decision attacked several of the 
majority’s arguments.  The dissenters recognized the generalizations made by the majority 
and exposed the lack of evidence used for support.28 The dissenting opinion, written by 
Justice Breyer, and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, argued that the 
Discover Bank rule was consistent with the FAA’s language. 29  Next, the dissent 
emphasized that Congress’ primary objective in enacting the FAA was not solely to 
guarantee the procedural advantages of arbitration.30 The dissent emphasized the Discover 
Bank rule’s efforts to “[do] just what § 2 requires, namely, put[] agreements to arbitrate 
and agreements to litigate ‘upon the same footing.’”31  
The dissent continued by invalidating the majority’s opinion that the Discover Bank 
rule increased the complexity of arbitration procedures. 32  The dissent criticized the 
majority’s comparison of class arbitration with that of bilateral arbitration, stating the 
correct comparison, if anything, was between class arbitration and judicial class actions.33 
The dissent also recognized that no “rational lawyer” would have signed on to represent 
the Concepcions for the possibilities of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim.34 Finally, the 
dissent criticized the lack of any “meaningful support for [the Court’s] views in [the] 
                                                 
25 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989). 
26 See generally Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. at 360-61. 
29 Id. at 359 (noting in addition that the Discover Bank rule was consistent with the purpose behind the FAA, 
in that the purpose was to “make valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration”). 
30 Id. at 359-60 (explaining that the primary objective was to secure the “enforcement” of agreements to 
arbitrate). 
31 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 361. 
32 Id. at 363-65 (noting that class arbitration was consistent with the use of arbitration, and further, that class 
arbitration was well known in California and followed elsewhere). 
33 Id. at 363 (emphasizing that California applied the same legal principles to address the unconscionability 
of class arbitration waivers as it did to address the unconscionability of any other contractual provision). 
34 Id. at 365 (agreeing with California’s “perfectly rational view” that nonclass arbitration over such sums 
would sometimes have the effect of depriving claimants of their claims). 
Court’s precedent.” 35  The dissent cited precedent that authorized complex arbitration 
procedures, upheld nondiscriminatory state laws that slowed down arbitration proceedings, 
and found no precedent “strik[ing] down a statute that treat[ed] arbitrations on par with 
judicial and administrative proceedings.”36 
Concepcion’s dissenting Justices carefully and meticulously stripped down the 
majority’s opinion, recognizing the lack of support and empirical evidence provided by 
Justice Scalia, the author of the opinion.  Thus, although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet 
to weigh in on the use of class action waivers in the employment context, the 5-4 split in 
Concepcion reveals strong ideological differences among the Justices.  With the passing of 
Justice Scalia, the largely unsettled issue of class action waivers in U.S. arbitration law will 
be at the mercy of the newly confirmed Justice, Neil Gorsuch. 
III. THE VALUE OF CLASS ACTIONS FOR EMPLOYEES AND THE PURPOSE OF THE NLRA 
The ability to bring a class action among low-wage workers is particularly 
important because these individuals often have “legitimate claims with low, individual 
value.”37 A class action “is a procedural device that permits one or more plaintiffs to file 
and prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a larger group, or ‘class.’”38 Section 7 of the NLRA 
seeks to protect such workers by equalizing the bargaining power between employees and 
employers by granting the right to collective bargaining.39 This section will explore why 
class actions are so important for low-wage employees, the efforts of the NLRA to protect 
such rights, and how the U.S. Supreme Court has restricted these rights by weakening 
exceptions to the FAA. 
A. The Need for Class Action Rights Among Low-Wage Employees  
The rights of low-wage workers are frequently violated, and low-wage workers 
particularly struggle to bring individual claims against employers for several reasons.40 
These reasons include, but are not limited to, the costs of litigation, a lack of financial 
                                                 
35 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 366. 
36 Id. 
37 Nicole Wredberg, Note, Subverting Workers’ Rights: Class Action Waivers and the Arbitral Threat to the 
NLRA, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 885 (2016). 
38 Class Action, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/class_action (“Put 
simply, the device allows courts to manage lawsuits that would otherwise be unmanageable if each class 
member . . . were required to be joined in the lawsuit as a named plaintiff.”). 
39 See 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
40 See Wredberg, supra note 37, at 885. 
resources, and fear of retaliation from employers.41 Because class actions are threatening 
to employers, arbitration agreements increasingly and strategically are drafted to include 
class and collective action waivers.42  Low-wage employees, who often do not have the 
financial capacity to reject an opportunity to work, are forced to enter into adhesive 
arbitration agreements.  Justice Scalia, in the majority opinion of Concepcion, noted that 
“class arbitration greatly increase[ed] risks to defendants.”43 However, a more accurate 
statement would be “that class arbitration levels the playing field in agreements that have 
historically left plaintiffs at a significant disadvantage.”44 Both courts and legal scholars 
have recognized that adhesive arbitration agreements are advantageous to defendants such 
as AT&T Mobility because (1) consumers often do not understand or pay attention to the 
wording of an arbitration provision; (2) the consumer has little bargaining power even if 
the individual knows the consequences of an adhesive arbitration provision; and (3) 
individual arbitration is not practical for consumers with small-value claims.45 Companies 
and employers alike have placed class action waivers in adhesive arbitration provisions 
with knowledge of these disadvantages.  However, in the employment arena, NLRA 
Section 7 provides a potential defense to employees who want to aggregate claims.46  The 
U.S. Supreme Court will have to decide whether NLRA Section 7 can be reconciled with 
the overwhelming enforcement of arbitration agreements.47   
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 See Hodges, supra note 13, at 1687-88 (explaining, “Class actions are the legal bane of businesses.  They 
enable large groups of consumers or employees to band together to sue the employer in one action.  They are 
particularly useful for cases where each plaintiff has a small claim that would cost more to litigate than the 
claim is worth.  Litigating as a group makes it cost-effective to bring the case.  Thus, the ability to bring a 
class action may increase the business’s vulnerability to legal claims.  Additionally, class actions are costly 
and time-consuming to litigate.  They often attract media attention and accordingly may affect a company’s 
reputation.  As a result, there is considerable pressure on companies to settle such claims when they are 
filed.”). 
43 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350. 
44 Peter Danysh, Comment, Employing the Right Test: The Importance of Restricting AT&T v. Concepcion 
to Consumer Adhesion Contracts, 50 HOUS. L.REV. 1433, 1449 (2013). 
45 Id. at 1149-50. 
46 See generally 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
47 SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 9. 
B. Section 7 of the NLRA  
Section 7 of the NLRA seeks to equalize the bargaining power between employers 
and employees by bestowing the rights to bargain collectively.48 Section 7 of the NLRA 
reads: 
 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have 
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that 
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor 
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 
8(a)(3).49 
 
In summary, Section 7 of the NLRA permits employees to engage collectively 
against more powerful employers.50 Circuit courts have struggled to reconcile the strong 
federal policy in favor of arbitration with federal employment statutes like the NLRA.51 
There are two general statutory exceptions to the strong federal policy in favor of 
arbitration.52 The first exception, also known as the “savings clause” exception, can be 
found in the final sentence of Section 2 of the FAA, and reads “save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”53 The “savings clause” of the 
FAA, also referred to as Section 2, reads: 
  
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to 
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit 
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, 
                                                 
48 See generally 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
49 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
50 See id.  
51 See generally Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157 (reconciling the FAA with the NLRA); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 
737 F.3d at 357 (refusing to reconcile the FAA and NLRA and rejecting the NLRB’s interpretation of the 
NLRA as precluding class action waivers); Morris v. Ernst & Young, 834 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(concluding the arbitration clause at issue interfered with the NLRA’s Section 7 right to concerted activity 
and therefore could not be enforced); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 296-97 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(concluding the Fair Labor Standards Act “FLSA” did not have a “contrary congressional command” 
sufficient to override the FAA); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding the 
FLSA lacked a “contrary congressional command” sufficient to override the mandate of the FAA). 
52 Wredberg, supra note 37, at 899-900. 
53 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
transaction, or refusal shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.54 
 
The second exception exists where another statute conflicts with the FAA and 
provides a “clear congressional command” to override the FAA. 55  The “effective-
vindication” doctrine, created by the courts, is a method to ensure that arbitration is an 
“effective mechanism” for vindicating federal statutory rights. 56  The necessity of the 
effective-vindication doctrine was reinforced by a fiery dissent from Justice Kagan in 
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)57 (“Italian 
Colors”).  Justice Kagan noted the majority’s disregard of the effective vindication 
exception, and emphasized that “an arbitration clause may not thwart federal law, 
irrespective of exactly how it does so.”58 However, although these remedies do exist to 
combat the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
illustrated its willingness to enforce arbitration agreements despite the potential for 
unfairness among aggrieved parties.59 
 As a result, several circuit courts have struggled to reconcile the FAA with other 
statutory rights proscribed in federal employment statutes.  The Seventh Circuit and the 
Ninth Circuit created a circuit split by supporting the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA 
as precluding class action waivers, and both opinions attempted to reconcile two very 
powerful federal statutes, the FAA and the NLRA.60 Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit, on the 
other side of the split, held that the NLRA did not contain a “contrary congressional 
command” exempting the statute from application of the NLRA.61 
                                                 
54 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
55 Wredberg, supra note 37, at 900. 
56 Okezie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the Effective Vindication Doctrine in U.S. Arbitration 
Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375, 375 (2014) (noting the Supreme Court’s decision in Italian Colors 
“severely restricted the availability of the doctrine”). 
57 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
58 Id. at 2313. 
59 See generally id. at 2312; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 346-52. 
60 See Morris, 834 F.3d at 985; Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157. 
61 D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d at 362 (refusing to reconcile the two federal statutes and emphasizing 
the superiority of the FAA). 
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: LEWIS IN SUPPORT OF THE BOARD 
A. The Michael Cuda Decision and the Fifth Circuit’s Reversal  
In January of 2012, the Board published an opinion in an effort to reconcile the 
FAA and the NLRA.62 In Michael Cuda, a homebuilder began to require each new and 
current employee to execute a “Mutual Arbitration Agreement” (“MAA”) as a condition 
of employment. 63  Application and enforcement of the MAA waived the rights of 
employees to proceed in a class or collective action because the agreement required that all 
employment-related disputes were to be resolved through individual arbitration.64  
The Board found in favor of the employee, while asserting several ideas throughout 
the opinion that would prove to be controversial.65 The Board stated Section 7 of the NLRA 
was a “substantive right.”66 The “substantive right” of NLRA Section 7 “lies at the heart 
of the restructuring of employer/employee relationships that Congress meant to achieve in 
the statute.”67  Most controversially, Michael Cuda established a three-prong analysis, 
ultimately concluding there was no conflict between the FAA and NLRA under the 
circumstances of the case at hand.68 First, the Board stated the purpose of the FAA was to 
prevent courts from treating arbitration agreements less favorably than other private 
contracts, and therefore, “[t]o find that an arbitration agreement must yield to the NLRA is 
to treat it no worse than any other private contract that conflicts with Federal Labor Law.”69 
Second, the Board cited U.S. Supreme Court precedent that an agreement to arbitrate 
federal statutory claims, including employment claims, may not require a party to lose the 
substantive rights afforded by such statute.70 Third, the Board noted that nothing in the text 
of the FAA suggested that an arbitration agreement inconsistent with the NLRA is 
“nevertheless enforceable.”71  
                                                 
62 See Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2285. 
63 Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2277. 
64 Id. at 2277.  
65 See id. at 2280-88. 
66 Id. at 2278. 
67 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1160 (emphasizing that the right to collective action under NLRA Section 7 is not 
merely a procedural one). 
68 Michael Cuda, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2285-88. 
69 Id. at 2285. 
70 Id. (citing Gilmer v. Johnson/Interstate Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)).  
71 Id. at 2287. 
The Board’s interpretation of the NLRA as precluding class action waivers was 
short-lived after the Fifth Circuit invalidated the Board’s opinion.72 The Fifth Circuit, in 
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir. 2013) (“D.R. Horton, Inc. v. 
NLRB”), rejected the Board’s reconciliation of the FAA and the NLRA and granted 
significantly more weight to the FAA.73 The Fifth Circuit first stated the use of class action 
procedures was not a “substantive right,” and continued its analysis by citing Concepcion, 
ultimately concluding that the Board’s rule did not fit within the savings clause of the 
FAA.74 The Fifth Circuit also rejected the “contrary congressional command” exception to 
the FAA.75  
Two additional circuit courts have analyzed the issue of class action waivers in 
employment agreements.76 The Eighth Circuit, in Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 
1050 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Bristol Care”), directly rejected the plaintiff’s request to follow the 
Board’s rationale in Michael Cuda, and held that arbitration agreements containing class 
waivers were enforceable in claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”).77 The Second Circuit, in Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2nd 
Cir. 2013) (“Sutherland”), addressed the issue of whether an employee could invalidate a 
class action waiver provision in the arbitration agreement when that waiver removed the 
financial incentive for her to pursue a claim under the FLSA.78 The Second Circuit began 
its analysis by citing the liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration,79 and swiftly rejected 
the “contrary congressional command” and “effective vindication” exceptions to the 
FAA.80 
                                                 
72 See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d at 348. 
73 See id. at 357. 
74 D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d at 359. 
75 Id. at 360. 
76 See generally Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 
702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013). 
77 Bristol Care, 702 F.3d at 1055 (emphasizing the absence of any contrary congressional command from the 
FLSA that a right to engage in class actions overrides the mandate of the FAA in favor of arbitration). 
78 Sutherland, 726 F.3d at 292. 
79 Id. at 296. 
80 Id. at 296-98 (citing Italian Colors, which held the effective vindication doctrine could not be used to 
invalidate class-action waiver provisions in circumstances where the recovery sought is exceeded by the costs 
of individual arbitration). 
B. The Lewis Decision and Reasoning 
In a recent decision out of the Seventh Circuit, the court in Lewis became the first 
federal circuit court of appeals to support the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA as 
precluding class arbitration waivers.81  Lewis simultaneously provided a framework for the 
U.S. Supreme Court to decide once and for all the validity of class action waivers in the 
employment context.82 The underlying dispute in Lewis involved an email sent by Epic 
Systems to some of its employees. 83  The email contained an arbitration agreement 
mandating that wage-and-hour claims could be brought only through individual arbitration 
and that employees waived “the right to participate in or receive money or any other relief 
from any class, collective, or representative proceeding.”84 
The court first established that filing a collective or class action suit constituted 
“concerted activit[y]” under Section 7 of the NLRA.85 Next, the court cited the important 
policy implications favoring the right of employees to engage in collective or class action 
suits.86 The Seventh Circuit most importantly provided a thorough analysis reconciling the 
NLRA with the FAA.87 The Seventh Circuit refused to follow the precedent of other 
circuits, and rather than allow the FAA to override the NLRA, the court in Lewis 
emphasized, “[B]efore we rush to decide whether one statute eclipses another, we must 
stop to see if the two statutes conflict at all.”88 
The Seventh Circuit, unlike court opinions before Lewis, fluidly reconciled the 
FAA and the NLRA, even going as far to state the two federal statutes worked “hand in 
glove.”89 The Seventh Circuit directly attacked the Fifth Circuit’s decision in D.R. Horton, 
Inc. v. NLRB, noting the logic of the Fifth Circuit’s decision had “several problems.”90 The 
                                                 
81 See Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1159. 
82  Id. at 1157-59 (concluding the employment agreement in question violated the NLRA and was 
unenforceable under the FAA).  
83 Id. at 1151.  
84 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1151. 
85 Id. at 1152. 
86 Id. at 1153 (stating “Collective, representative, and class legal remedies allow employees to band together 
and thereby equalize bargaining power.”). 
87 Id. at 1157. 
88 See id. at 1156 (emphasizing that a conclusion in which the FAA trumps the NLRA “puts the cart before 
the horse.”). 
89 Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157. 
90 Id. at 1158 (diminishing the logic of D.R. Horton II because the Fifth Circuit (1) relied on dicta of Supreme 
Court precedent, (2) made no effort to harmonize the FAA and NLRA, and (3) failed to note that the NLRA 
is in fact pro-arbitration.). 
Seventh Circuit gave “equal footing” to the FAA and the NLRA.91 The Seventh Circuit’s 
final point established that the right to collective action in Section 7 was a substantive right, 
not a procedural one.92 On September 2, 2016, Epic Systems Corporation filed a writ of 
certiorari, and on January 13, 2017, the petition was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court.93 
Lewis was consolidated with Morris and Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 
(5th Cir. 2015), and will be argued in front of the Supreme Court in the October 2017 
Term.94 
C. The Author of the Lewis Decision: Judge Diane P. Wood  
The Lewis opinion was carefully drafted, and seamlessly reconciled the NLRA with 
the FAA, a solution that circuit courts had been previously unwilling to apply.  The author 
of the Lewis decision, Judge Diane P. Wood, cannot be overlooked.  Judge Wood is a 
highly respected judge among her peers in the legal profession.95 Judge Wood has played 
the role “of philosophical outlier, a left-leaning woman in a world of right-leaning men,”96 
including Judge Posner and Judge Frank H. Easterbrook.  Judge Wood was appointed by 
President Clinton in 1995 and became the second woman on the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals.97 Judge Wood has focused on the importance of individual rights in many of her 
Seventh Circuit opinions.98  
Judge Wood’s ideas on constitutional interpretation and her opinions supporting 
individual rights would have placed her “firmly on the left in the Court.”99 Further, the 
more liberal justices have generally agreed with Judge Wood’s views, and her opinions 
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have “generally fared well before the court as a whole.”100 Judge Wood has been called 
“an articulate proponent for a dynamic Constitution.”101 Judge Wood is well known for her 
lecture on her understanding of constitutional interpretation.102 In her lecture, Judge Wood 
thoroughly explained her argument that the Framers of the Constitution enshrined “only 
the broadest principles in the Constitution.”103 An excerpt from Judge Wood’s lecture 
reads: 
 
First and most important is the idea that we should take seriously the fact 
that the text of the Constitution tends to reflect broad principles, not specific 
prescriptions.  Neither James Madison, for whom this lecture is named, nor 
any of the other Framers of the Constitution, were oblivious, careless, or 
otherwise unaware of the words they chose for the document and its Bill of 
Rights.  The papers they left behind leave no doubt that they hoped to be 
writing for the ages.  There is no more reason to think that they expected 
the world to remain static than there is to think that any of us holds a crystal 
ball.  The only way to create a foundational document that could stand the 
test of time was to build enough flexibility that later generations would be 
able to adapt to their own needs and uses.104 
 
Judge Wood’s willingness to reconcile the NLRA and the FAA in her Seventh 
Circuit Lewis decision likely flows naturally from her strong beliefs in the ever-growing 
and ever-changing dynamics of the law.  Judge Wood creates practical, logical analyses to 
support her arguments, and is not afraid to stand up for her views against the “conservative 
jurisprudence of the right.”105 
Judge Wood was even considered by President Obama as a possible Supreme Court 
nominee in 2010.106 Although President Obama did not appoint Judge Wood in the end, 
the President sought “an intellectual counterweight” to Chief Justice Roberts, but who also 
possessed “the same consensus-building skills” as Justice Stevens, such skills that could 
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potentially tip a 5-4 court toward more liberal outcomes.107 President Obama saw potential 
in Judge Wood, largely as a result of her time with Judges Easterbrook and Posner on the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.108 Judge Posner has been quoted as stating, “I think 
[Judge Wood has] been very tactful in dealing with people – not giving up her views but 
trying to look for common ground.”109 This “common ground” approach taken by Judge 
Wood is clearly illustrated in her Lewis decision, and reflects a practical approach to 
resolving the problem of class action waivers found in adhesive arbitration agreements.   
D. The Morris Decision and Reasoning 
Just a few months later, in August of 2016, the Ninth Circuit published an opinion 
agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, and deepening the circuit split.110 In Morris v. Ernst & 
Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that an employer violated 
the NLRA by requiring employees to sign a concerted action waiver as a condition of 
employment because preventing concerted work-related legal claims interfered with the 
exercise of the employees’ right to act in concert under NLRA Section 7. 111  Two 
employees working for the accounting firm Ernst & Young brought an action against their 
employer. 112  As a condition of employment, the employees were required to sign 
agreements not to join with other employees in bringing legal claims against the 
company.113 The “concerted action waiver” required employees to (1) pursue any legal 
claims against the company exclusively through arbitration; and (2) arbitrate only as 
individuals and in “separate proceedings.” 114  In effect, the “concerted action waiver” 
prevented employees from initiating concerted legal claims against Ernst & Young in any 
forum, including in court, or in arbitration proceedings.115 
The Ninth Circuit first established important employee rights that were to be 
binding on the court’s decision.116 The Ninth Circuit stated “employees have the right to 
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pursue work-related legal claims together,”117 and further, that the Supreme Court has 
reaffirmed the “considerable deference” owed to the Board’s interpretations of the 
NLRA.118 Next, the Ninth Circuit accepted the Board’s interpretation of Section 7 and 
Section 8 of the NLRA.119 Similar to the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit 
reconciled the FAA with the NLRA, concluding the FAA did not reach a contrary result.120 
The Ninth Circuit framed the issue in favor of the liberal federal policy in favor of 
arbitration, because the problem with the contract was the waiver of a substantive federal 
right, and not the requirement of arbitration.121 
In line with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit established the 
right to concerted action under Section 7 of the NLRA as a “substantive” right.122 The 
Ninth Circuit also refused to allow the NLRA and the FAA to “trump” the other.123 Instead, 
the Ninth Circuit determined that when an arbitration contract waives a substantive federal 
right, “the saving clause of the FAA prevents the enforcement of that waiver.”124  
The Ninth Circuit provided a brief analysis of why “[t]he interaction between the 
NLRA and the FAA makes this case distinct from other FAA enforcement challenges in at 
least three additional and important ways.”125 First, the Ninth Circuit stated the terms of 
the contract were accurately described as “illegal” because the employment contract 
waived a federal substantive right.126 Second, the enforcement defense in the issue at hand 
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had nothing to do with the adequacy of the arbitration proceedings.127 Third, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that the “enforcement” defense did not “disfavor” arbitration.128 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded its reasoning with nothing short of a blow to the FAA, stating, “Further, 
nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent arbitration case law suggests that a party may simply 
incant the acronym “FAA” and receive protection for illegal contract terms anytime the 
party suggests it will enjoy arbitration less without those illegal terms.”129  The Ninth 
Circuit emphasized that parties invoking the FAA cannot exploit the strong federal policy 
in favor of arbitration to usurp the legal system.130 
The majority’s decision was followed by a strong dissent by Judge Sandra Segal 
Ikuta, reflecting the strong liberal policy in favor or arbitration.131 Judge Ikuta stated:  
 
Today the majority holds that § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) precludes employees from waiving the right to arbitrate their 
disputes collectively, thus striking at the heart of the Federal Arbitration 
Act’s (FAA) command to enforce arbitration agreements according to their 
terms.  This decision is breathtaking in its scope and in its error; it is directly 
contrary to Supreme Court precedent and joins the wrong side of a circuit 
split.132 
 
Judge Ikuta’s dissent illustrates the strong ideological differences among judges faced with 
the issue of class action waivers in arbitration agreements.  These ideological differences 
are also present on the U.S. Supreme Court, and therefore, the Lewis decision will be 
resolved in some capacity by a deeply divided bench in the October 2017 Term.133 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEWIS AND MORRIS DECISIONS 
A. Lewis and Class Action Waivers  
The Seventh and Ninth Circuit decisions are the only circuits thus far to agree with 
the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA as precluding class action waivers.  The Seventh 
Circuit, similar to the Board, attempted to reconcile the FAA and NLRA.134  The Michael 
Cuda and Lewis decisions attempted to justify their progressive holdings by placing 
important limits on the rights of employees to engage in class actions.  The Board 
emphasized the limits of its holding, noting that only a small percentage of arbitration 
agreements would be potentially affected.135 The Seventh Circuit also justified its decision 
by recognizing that the NLRA was “pro-arbitration.”136  
Both decisions recognized that invalidating class action waivers would likely 
receive scrutiny under the current federal policy in favor of arbitration.137  The Board and 
the Seventh Circuit, by reconciling the FAA and the NLRA, engaged in an analysis that 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and several other circuit courts, have refused to engage in.  The 
NLRA’s strong federal policy equalizing the bargaining rights between employers and 
employees cannot be ignored in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s willingness to impose 
class action waivers found within adhesive arbitration agreements.138 The Lewis decision 
engaged in a thorough, substantive analysis to reach its conclusion, unlike the other 
circuits, which so quickly emphasized the superiority of the FAA.139    
The Lewis decision provides a sound legal analysis for the U.S. Supreme Court to 
consider.  The validity of class action waivers in the employment context carries heavy 
weight, as collective action for employees may be the only avenue to ensure equal 
bargaining power against employers who attempt to insulate their business from these 
remedies that, according to the Seventh Circuit, are guaranteed by Section 7 of the NLRA 
and can be reconciled with the FAA.140  The Morris decision, decided within months of 
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the Lewis decision, deepened the circuit split and further established that the U.S. Supreme 
Court will need to address the issue of class action waivers in employment arbitration 
agreements.   
B. Deference Owed to the National Labor Relations Board  
At the core of the Morris decision in particular, Chief Judge Sidney R. Thomas 
placed a heavy emphasis on the deference courts owe to the National Labor Relations 
Board. 141  Chief Judge Thomas, in his Ninth Circuit opinion, began his analysis by 
recognizing the importance of the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA, while weighing the 
balancing act that has developed between the judicial system and federal agencies of the 
United States.142 Chief Judge Thomas stated that “[C]onsiderable deference” is owed to 
the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA, and that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis would begin 
with the Board’s “treatment of similar contract terms.”143 Chief Judge Thomas established 
the Board’s conclusion that an employer violates the NLRA when “[I]t requires employees 
covered by the Act, as a condition of their employment, to sign an agreement that precludes 
them from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or other 
working conditions against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial.144 Chief Judge 
Thomas next introduced the concept of “Chevron” deference to the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion.145 Under the theory of “Chevron deference,” a court cannot substitute its own 
construction “of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.”146  
The issue relevant to this article is the tension between the National Labor Relations 
Board (an administrative agency of the United States established by the National Labor 
Relations Act) and the Supreme Court of the United States.  The NLRA established that 
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employees have the right to “concerted action,” 147  but whether “concerted action” is 
required as an arbitral remedy is not clear.  The Chevron decision greatly increased the 
legitimacy and power of federal administrative agencies, where the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the EPA’s definition of the term “source” was a permissible construction of the 
Clean Air Act, which sought to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with 
economic growth.148  The U.S. Supreme Court established the standard for when courts 
could interfere with statutory interpretation and where such interference would be beyond 
the scope of the Supreme Court’s authority.149 Setting forth the standard, the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated: 
 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions.  First, always is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.  If, however, the court determines Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in 
the absence of an administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.150 
 
 Essentially, courts engage in a two-step analysis under Chevron, looking to 
whether (1) Congress spoken directly to the precise question at issue; and (2) if not, whether 
the agency’s construction of the statute reasonable.151 Justice Stevens also states several 
important policy arguments for why administrative agencies are owed deference.  For 
example, Justice Stevens stated that (1) judges are not experts in the field, unlike agencies; 
(2) the executive branch of government should be making policy choices, and not judges; 
and (3) judges have a duty to respect policy choices of executive branch agencies because 
they are ultimately accountable to the people.152 Justice Stevens’ strong policy argument 
represented the U.S. Supreme Court’s willingness to yield to the expertise of administrative 
agencies that administered statutes in “light of everyday realities.”153 Because the issue of 
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class action waivers in employment agreements will reach the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Court should recognize the Chevron deference principle.154  If the Court gives deference 
to the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA, then the Court will have to invalidate class 
action waivers in employment agreements because such waivers violate employees’ 
statutory right to “concerted activity” under the NLRA.155 
 Chief Judge Thomas applied the Chevron principles to the issue in Morris.156 Chief 
Judge Thomas emphasized, “In this case, we need go no further.  The intent of Congress is 
clear from the statute and is consistent with the Board’s interpretation.”157 Chief Judge 
Thomas began with the plain language of the NLRA and precedential cases to determine 
that the NLRA established the rights of employees to pursue work related claims 
together.158 Chief Judge Thomas also recognized the importance of Section 8 of the NLRA, 
which enforces Section 7 and “has long been held to prevent employers from 
circumventing the NLRA’s protection for concerted activity by requiring employees to 
agree to individual activity in its place.”159 Chief Judge Thomas then referenced the very 
clause at issue.160 The “separate proceedings” clause did not allow employees to pursue 
work-related claims individually, and further, employees were legally bound by the 
result.161 Chief Judge Thomas determined that “[t]his restriction is the ‘very antithesis’ of 
§ 7’s substantive right to pursue concerted work-related legal claims.”162  Concluding his 
Chevron deference analysis, Chief Judge Thomas recognized the Board’s accurate 
interpretation of Section 7 and Section 8 of the NLRA.163 Chief Judge Thomas did not 
proceed to the second step of Chevron analysis because under his impression, the NLRA 
was “unambiguous.”164   
 Applied together, the Seventh Circuit’s Lewis decision and the Ninth Circuit’s 
Morris decision applied reasoning that the U.S. Supreme Court cannot ignore.  The Seventh 
Circuit’s reconciliation between the FAA and NLRA, combined with the Ninth Circuit’s 
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Chevron deference analysis, represent the tension between two federal statutes as well as 
the tension between the judicial system and administrative agencies.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court will soon resolve the issue of class action waivers in the employment context in the 
October 2017 Term, and the Court will likely have to address these important power 
struggles recognized by the Lewis and Morris decisions.165  
C. Is Class Arbitration Realistic Procedurally?  
Taking a brief step away from the legal analysis, the ability of arbitration 
procedures to handle “class arbitration” will be an issue that the U.S. Supreme Court will 
need to address for the first time since Concepcion.166  In the Concepcion decision, the late 
Justice Scalia addressed what he believed to be structural issues surrounding class-wide 
arbitration.167 Justice Scalia stated:  
 
Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and 
different procedures and involving higher stakes.  Confidentiality becomes 
more difficult.  And while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator 
with some expertise relevant to the class-certification question, arbitrators 
are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects 
of certification, such as the protection of absent parties.168  
 
Justice Scalia also believed the switch from “bilateral” to multilateral arbitration 
would sacrifice the “informality” of arbitration and thereby increase costs, time, and 
procedural delay.169 Justice Scalia cited the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) 
statistics and recognized the AAA’s class arbitration procedures. 170  Justice Scalia 
emphasized that “not a single” class arbitration had resulted in a final award on the merits, 
and further, that the average time from filing to settlement, withdrawal, or dismissal, was 
630 days for class arbitrations.171  
 Justice Scalia continued his analysis with reference to the AAA rules governing 
class arbitrations, and recognized that the rules “mimic[ed]” the Federal Rules of Civil 
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Procedure for class litigation.172 Justice Scalia noted concern for absent class members who 
would not be bound by the arbitration, because of the ability of parties to alter class 
arbitration procedures by contract. 173  Justice Scalia also recognized the potential for 
arbitrator errors that may go uncorrected because of the “absence of multilayered review” 
in arbitration procedures.174 Justice Scalia concluded his grievances with class arbitration 
procedures by stating that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class 
litigation.”175 Justice Scalia supported his proposition by recognizing the minimal authority 
of the courts to vacate an arbitral award, as well as the inability of parties to expand the 
grounds or nature of judicial review.176 
 While several of Justice Scalia’s arguments in Concepcion do raise practical 
concerns, a look into the AAA’s “Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations” and a 
glimpse at more recent statistics suggest that class-wide arbitration may not be completely 
out of reach for consumers and employees who would benefit from the aggregation of 
claims.177  In a 2015 article titled Have Class Arbitrations Found New Life? (“NYLJ 
Article”), the authors suggested that “in spite of [that] critique and the widespread use of 
clauses in which the parties waive any right to arbitration on a class basis, class arbitrations 
continue to be filed and result in decisions.”178 The NYLJ Article also referenced the same 
AAA brief mentioned in Justice Scalia’s Concepcion majority opinion. 179  The AAA 
recognizes, that at the time of submittal, out of 283 separate class arbitrations filed, no class 
arbitrations have resulted in a final award on the merits.180 However, since the submittal of 
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the AAA’s brief and the Concepcion decision, there have been class arbitrations that 
proceeded to merit awards.181  
 For example, the NYLJ Article cited two recent cases to support the proposition 
that class arbitrations may be feasible components to class litigation.  First, the NYLJ 
Article cited a Fourth Circuit case that confirmed a class arbitration award in favor of 
487,066 consumers using “credit repair” services.182 The NYLJ Article noted that some 
defendants entered into class-wide settlements “that resulted in an arbitral award of $2.6 
million in attorney fees to counsel for claimants.”183 The second case involves a class 
certification of 44,000 current and former female employees at retail jewelry stores who 
challenged pay and promotion practices carried out by their employers.184  The NYLJ 
Article also recognized that “[t]here has been no record of widespread complaints of 
procedural irregularities or unfairness in such cases, and class arbitrations can result in 
settlements administered much as class settlements in courts would be and in merits 
awards.”185  
 The “Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations” also represent sophisticated and 
thorough guidelines for those who wish to engage in class-wide arbitration. 186   For 
example, similar to the rules governing class litigation, a class may be certified for class 
arbitration only if each of the following six conditions are met: 
 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of separate arbitrations on behalf 
of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class; 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class; 
(5) counsel selected to represent the class will fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class; and  
(6) each class member has entered into an agreement containing an 
arbitration clause which is substantially similar to that signed by the 
class representative(s) and each of the other class members.187 
                                                 
181 Id. (citing Jones v. Dancel, 792 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2015); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, 646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 
2011)). 
182 Id. (citing Jones v. Dancel, 792 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2015)). 
183 Cartier, supra note 178. 
184 Id. (citing Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, 646 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2011)). 
185 Id.  
186 AAA, supra note 177. 
187 AAA, supra note 177. 
 Thus, with recent successful attempts at class-wide arbitration, the U.S. Supreme Court 
will have to recognize the developments that have been made since the Concepcion 
decision now that Lewis has been granted certiorari.   
As illustrated by the factors above, the AAA requires several considerations by an 
arbitrator before a class can be certified.  Further, under the “Confidentiality” section of 
the Supplemental Rules, the AAA states that “The presumption of privacy and 
confidentiality in arbitration proceedings shall not apply in class arbitrations.  All class 
arbitration hearings and filings may be made public, subject to the authority of the arbitrator 
to provide otherwise in special circumstances.”188 The AAA also maintains a docket of 
arbitrations filed as class arbitrations on the AAA website. 189 Finally, the AAA requires 
any award rendered under the Supplementary Rules to be in writing, with reasoning, and 
signed by the arbitrator or majority of arbitrators.190 A preliminary filing fee alone amounts 
to $3,350 for a party seeking class arbitration.191  The significant costs of entering into 
arbitration illustrate why aggregating smaller claims in the hopes of achieving larger 
settlements may be attractive to parties with common questions of law or fact.   
The AAA rules are an example of one vehicle that provides for class arbitration 
procedures.  There is no denying that a very small number of class arbitration procedures 
have reached an award on the merits.192  However, class-wide arbitration procedures do 
exist, and provide a tool for consumers and employees to aggregate claims that will likely 
not be worth arbitrating alone.193  Thus, adhesive arbitration provisions found in consumer 
and employee contracts deny these individuals the right to engage in class action litigation 
or class-wide arbitration if they so choose.  
VI. LOOKING FORWARD: THE FATE OF CLASS ACTION WAIVERS 
A. Push-Back by Consumers after Concepcion  
Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s message in Concepcion validated class action 
waivers in consumer agreements, consumer advocates have pushed back in favor of 
protecting the rights of consumers.  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) 
proposed the prohibition of mandatory arbitration clauses that deny groups of consumers 
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their day in court.194 In a press release from the CFPB, the statement recognized that 
“widely used [adhesive arbitration] clauses” leave consumers with no choice but to seek 
individual relief.195 
The CFPB recognized the wide reach of these mandatory arbitration clauses, 
bringing to light the “hundreds of million of consumer contracts” affected by this business 
practice.196 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act,197 in conjunction with the Consumer 
Protection Act198 (“CPA”), required the CFPB to study the use of mandatory arbitration 
clauses in consumer financial markets.199 Congress also gave the CFPB the power to issue 
regulations that are in the public interest, for the protection of consumers, and consistent 
with the study.200  
The CFPB’s study, released in March 2015, found that “Consumers are generally 
unaware of whether their credit card contracts include arbitration clauses.”201 The study 
found that class actions provided a more effective means for consumers to challenge the 
practices used by companies in the business of credit cards or bank accounts.202  The 
CFBP’s proposal referenced potential remedies for consumers. 203   These remedies 
included (1) prohibiting companies from placing mandatory arbitration clauses in new 
contracts that prevent class action lawsuits; and (2) requiring companies with arbitration 
clauses to submit CFPB claims, awards, and certain related materials that are filed in 
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arbitration cases.204 The CFPB press release recognized three benefits of the proposal, 
including (1) a day in court for consumers; (2) a deterrent effect [for companies placing 
these provisions in contracts]; and (3) increased transparency.205 The CFPB’s proposed 
rule has not yet become final, and the CFPB is currently in the process of reviewing public 
comments.206 If the proposed rule becomes final, the CFPB’s efforts will represent a major 
victory for consumers and a major blow to consumer product and service providers.  This 
is because the proposed rule represents an effort to chip away at the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Concepcion decision, which left consumers at the mercy of adhesive arbitration provisions. 
B. Granted Certiorari: The Issue Before the Supreme Court  
On January 13, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Epic Systems’ petition for a 
writ of certiorari.207 The U.S. Supreme Court ordered that Lewis be consolidated with the 
Ninth Circuit’s Morris decision and the Fifth Circuit’s Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 
F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015) decision.208 The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court is “whether 
an agreement that requires an employer and an employee to resolve employment-related 
disputes through individual arbitration, and waive class and collective proceedings, is 
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, notwithstanding the provisions of the 
National Labor Relations Act.”209 The issue of class action waivers in employment disputes 
will likely be resolved along the lines of political ideology, similar to the Concepcion 
decision, 210  which illustrated the sharp ideological divide between Supreme Court 
Justices.211 With the nomination and appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch by President 
Trump,212 the likelihood of a decision coming down against class action waivers is slim. 
The Murphy Oil decision appeared before the Fifth Circuit after the National Labor 
Relations Board concluded that Murphy Oil USA, Inc. had “unlawfully required employees 
at its Alabama facility to sign an arbitration agreement waiving their right to pursue class 
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and collective actions.”213 Author of the opinion Judge Leslie H. Southwick noted that 
Murphy Oil strategically used “broad venue rights” to file its petition with the Fifth Circuit 
knowing that the circuit would rule in its favor, against the Board.214  The aggrieved 
employees in Murphy Oil argued that the binding arbitration agreement they signed 
interfered with their rights under NLRA’s Section 7 to engage in concerted activity.215 
Judge Southwick’s opinion did not fail to emphasize the Board’s refusal to follow the Fifth 
Circuit’s D.R. Horton II decision.216 Judge Southwick also made clear that the Fifth Circuit 
was not going to repeat its analysis from D.R. Horton II.217 Judge Southwick once again 
emphasized the Board’s disregard of D.R. Horton II and stated “Our decision was issued 
not quite two years ago; we will not repeat its analysis here.  Murphy Oil committed no 
unfair labor practice by requiring employees to relinquish their right to pursue class or 
collective claims in all forums by signing the arbitration agreements at issue here.”218 The 
Fifth Circuit did note, however, that in the Board’s favor, the Board may “well not know” 
which circuit’s law would be applied on a petition for review.219 Judge Southwick further 
stated, “We do not celebrate the Board’s failure to follow our D.R. Horton [II] reasoning, 
but neither do we condemn its nonacquiescence.” 220  The Murphy Oil decision be 
consolidated with Lewis and Morris, and the conflict between the FAA and the NLRA will 
be decided at some capacity in the October 2017 Term. 
 Epic Systems Corporation’s “Petition for a Writ of Certiorari” (“Petition”) and 
Jacob Lewis’ “Brief for the Respondent in Opposition” (“Opposition”) presented two 
persuasive and significantly differing takes on the issue to be presented before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and are worth mentioning in some detail.221 The Petition framed the issue 
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around the “contrary congressional command” exception to the FAA, and argued that 
NLRA’s Section 7 did not possess such command as to override the FAA.222 Further, the 
Petition framed the circuit split much differently than the Opposition.223  The Petition 
stated: 
 
The courts are squarely divided over this important and recurring question.  
Three federal courts of appeals (the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits) and 
two state courts of last resort (the California and Nevada Supreme Courts) 
have concluded that the answer is no: agreements to submit employment 
disputes to individual arbitration are fully enforceable.  Two other federal 
courts of appeals (the Seventh and Ninth Circuits)—as well as the National 
Labor Relations Board—have concluded that the answer is yes: these 
agreements are unenforceable because they bar class and collective 
proceedings.224 
 
The Petition asked the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve and acknowledge the split.225 
In addition, the Petition described the Fifth Circuit as “squarely and repeatedly” upholding 
class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements.226 The Petition described the 
Eighth Circuit as concluding that employment arbitration agreements containing class 
action waivers were enforceable under the FAA, “notwithstanding federal labor laws or the 
NLRB’s interpretation of those laws,”227 and the Second Circuit as agreeing with the Fifth 
and the Eighth Circuits.228 The circuit split was characterized as “fully developed” and 
“ripe for resolution” by the U.S. Supreme Court.229  
The Petition continued by discussing the conflict between the NLRA and the FAA, 
and immediately noted that “[f]ederal statutes are not all on equal footing when it comes 
to arbitration agreements.”230 The Petition also cited CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 
132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) as authority for the notion that the FAA is the proper statute 
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governing arbitration provisions, even when other federal statutes are involved.231 The 
Petition also cited the argument previously referenced in Concepcion, that the FAA 
envisioned “bilateral” and not “multilateral” arbitration. 232  The Petition criticized the 
Seventh Circuit’s failure to address whether the NLRA presented a “contrary congressional 
command,” and called the Seventh Circuit’s analysis “flawed from start to finish.”233 
Finally, the Petition concluded its argument by citing policy reasons driving the resolution 
of the circuit split.234 The Petition noted the uncertainty faced by both employers and 
employees because of the unresolved issue of class action waivers in employment 
agreements.235 The Petition also highlighted the “range” of companies affected by the split 
of authority.236 The Petition stated, “Absent action by this Court, the courts will continue 
to face repeat litigation on this question.”237 
In response, the Opposition framed the issue under the question that will ultimately 
be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.238 The Opposition asked the U.S. Supreme Court 
to decide whether the FAA’s savings clause bars enforcement of class action waivers that 
violate NLRA Section 7.239 Further, the Opposition immediately criticized the Petition’s 
argument by stating that the Petition: 
 
(1) mischaracterizes and exaggerates any split, (2) fails to address the merits 
of the issue the courts below actually did consider, (3) spins as “important 
and recurring,” [Pet. 4], an issue missing from the case, and (4) ignores 
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several defects that make this case a poor vehicle to review the question it 
might actually present, let alone one it does not.240 
 
The Opposition argued that the proper question before the U.S. Supreme Court should have 
been “(1) whether the NLRA makes collective-action waivers illegal and (2) if so, whether 
the FAA’s savings clause nonetheless requires their enforcement.” 241  In addition, the 
Opposition argued that only three circuits had analyzed the saving clause question.”242 
Next, the Opposition distinguished the Eighth Circuit and Second Circuit cases because 
the courts analyzed whether the FLSA constituted a “contrary congressional command,” 
and did not discuss the conflict between the FAA and the NLRA.243 The Opposition stated 
that the Seventh and Ninth Circuits “have identified the proper issue,” and therefore, the 
issue should be resolved in the lower courts before U.S. Supreme Court intervention.244  
The Opposition argued that the plain language and purpose of the NLRA, combined 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s and the Board’s interpretations of Section 7, support the 
conclusion that the NLRA grants employees a substantive right to pursue claims 
collectively.245 The Opposition also established that “concerted activities” clearly included 
“collective legal action.”246 The Opposition also referenced the Chevron deference owed 
to the Board because Congress here has “unambiguously spoken to the precise question at 
issue.”247 Finally, the Opposition rounded out its substantive argument by citing Section 8 
of the NLRA, which sets forth the principle that any contractual provisions conflicting with 
Section 7 of the NLRA are unlawful.248 The Opposition agreed with the decision by Judge 
Wood from the Seventh Circuit and used similar reconciliation language by stating, 
“Foreseeing potential conflicts between the FAA and other statutes, Congress included a 
saving clause…” to ensure than any arbitration provisions violating another federal statute 
would not be enforced.249 
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The Opposition even addressed Concepcion and Italian Colors, and suggested 
these holdings from the U.S. Supreme Court did not suggest in any manner that the FAA 
required the enforcement of an arbitration provision found to have violated a federal 
statute.250 The Opposition also attacked the Petition’s reliance on CompuCredit because 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in that case only answered the narrow question of 
whether the Credit Repair Organization Act (“CROA”) represented a “contrary 
congressional command” to foreclose arbitration.251 To conclude its brief, the Opposition 
asked the U.S. Supreme Court to acknowledge that Murphy Oil would be “the most 
appropriate vehicle” for the Supreme Court to review because the Board is a full party in 
that case.252 The Opposition’s issue presented will go before the U.S. Supreme Court.253  
For the first time since Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court will weigh in on the validity 
of class action waivers found within adhesive arbitration provisions.  While the issue 
presented involves the fate of employees, and not consumers, the decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court will likely put to rest the validity of class action waivers once and for all.  
The Lewis and Morris opinions provide powerful analyses for the U.S. Supreme Court to 
consider when deciding on the fate of class action waivers in employment agreements.  The 
major arguments set forth include the potential reconciliation of the FAA and the NLRA, 
and deference owed to the Board’s interpretation of NLRA Section 7.   The Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Murphy Oil provides the opposite side of the argument for why class action 
waivers should be valid.254  Despite the split of authority, there exists an undeniable policy 
argument that uncertainty among courts has led to a significant amount of uncertainty for 
employers and employees.255 The Petition noted that, “employers located in the Second, 
Fifth, and Eighth Circuits will continue to be subjected to NLRB enforcement actions 
against their use of class waivers.  And when the NLRB inevitably finds that the waivers 
are unenforceable, the employers must go through the hassle of filing a petition for review, 
even though the issue has been decided squarely in their favor in those circuits.”256  
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C. The Current Legal Landscape of the U.S. Supreme Court  
The timing of the Lewis decision may be potentially groundbreaking for the issue 
of class action waivers in adhesive arbitration agreements.  The issue of adhesive 
arbitration, and more specifically of class action waivers, is one of political ideology.  This 
is illustrated by the Concepcion decision, written by Justice Scalia.257  His opinion was 
followed by a strong dissent from Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and 
Justice Kagan. 258  President Trump nominated Judge Neil Gorsuch, who was recently 
appointed as the ninth Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court. 259   Justice Gorsuch was 
previously appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit by 
President George W. Bush in 2006.260 Justice Gorsuch was a confidant of the late Justice 
Scalia, and is known to share “Justice Scalia’s legal philosophy, talent for vivid writing 
and love of outdoors.”261 Justice Gorsuch “also seems to have a set of judicial/ideological 
commitments apart from his personal policy preferences that drive his decision-
making.”262 As a “textualist,” Justice Gorsuch’s opinion on the Chevron doctrine may be 
of particular importance if the U.S. Supreme Court nominee participates in the Lewis 
decision.263 Justice Scalia’s take on administrative law involved granting more power to 
administrative agencies and limiting the role of the courts in reviewing the interpretation 
of federal statutes by administrative agencies.264  The Lewis, Morris, and Murphy Oil 
decisions all have roots in the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA.  Justice Gorsuch’s view 
on administrative law involves less deference to administrative agencies and more 
deference to courts.265 Therefore, the accuracy of the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA 
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will likely be a relevant factor considered by Justice Gorsuch when he presides over the 
case.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
Now that the issue in Lewis will go before the U.S. Supreme Court, the validity of 
class action waivers in employment agreements will be settled in the October 2017 Term.  
Notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s strong disfavor of class action litigation and 
class-wide arbitration, the Lewis decision, Morris decision, and the Board’s interpretation 
of the NLRA as precluding class action waivers represent a significant trend toward 
recognizing the general unfairness of class action waivers in employment agreements.  The 
Seventh Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and the Board all recognize certain rights granted to 
employees under the NLRA that cannot be stripped away by the strong federal policy in 
favor of enforcing arbitration agreements.  The CFPB’s proposed rules also respond to the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion and illustrate an effort protect consumers, 
who have also fell victim to the validity of class action waivers present in adhesive 
arbitration agreements.  
Although procedures for class-wide arbitration do exist, there is no denying that 
class arbitration is difficult to carry out.  However, the right of employees to aggregate 
claims in an effort to level the playing field against employers has long been established 
by the NLRA, and the U.S. Supreme Court cannot merely disregard a federal statute just 
because that statute potentially conflicts with the FAA.  Opponents to the validation of 
class action waivers have now let their voices be heard, and the U.S. Supreme Court will 
have to balance the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration against the strong federal 
policy protecting the rights of employees to pursue work-related claims collectively against 
significantly more powerful employers. 
 
 
